We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4),...

Online communities provide a social sphere for people to share information and knowledge. While information sharing is becoming a ubiquitous online phenomenon, how to ensure information quality or induce quality content, however, remains a challenge due to the anonymity of commentators. This...

Online communities provide a social sphere for people to share information and knowledge. While information sharing is becoming a ubiquitous online phenomenon, how to ensure information quality or induce quality content, however, remains a challenge due to the anonymity of commentators. This...

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4),...

We develop a system for grid computing where the price of computing tasks is determined by an audited market-exchange. We show a method to provide a variable certificate, called \witness," of program execution with the following property: If two different agents running the same program on the...

Online reputation trading is a new phenomenon facilitated by the prosperity of e-commerce and social networks. Whether reputations will be reliable when people can purchase rather than build their reputations is a natural concern and also a challenge to online marketplaces. In the present study,...