This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from...

This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from...

This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of ownership concentration and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate minority...

In this paper we examine a combined set of corporate governance features that influence disclosure quality in a context of minority expropriation due to ownership concentration. This context allows studying a new agency conflict: controlling versus minority shareholders while most of previous...

Family businesses are an important part of the world economy (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and differ considerably from non-family firms with regard to corporate governance. However, despite their difference, family businesses have received relatively little research attention. Our study contributes...