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This paper analyzes risk aversion in discriminatory share auctions. I generalize the k-step share auction model of Kastl (2011, 2012) and establish that marginal profits are set identified for any given coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion. I also derive necessary conditions for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244684
auction is a full insurance auction, and (iii) in general neither the first nor the second price auction is optimal (even with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702781
overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and … predictions in the second-price all-pay auctions for spiteful preferences are different than those for risk averse preferences …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002983
We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146346
Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expectations. I analyze this expectation-based loss aversion (Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2009)) in the context of dynamic and static auctions, where the reference point is given by the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762533
We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, which are strategically equivalent under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753992
Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expectations. I analyze this expectation-based loss aversion (Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2009)) in the context of dynamic and static auctions, where the reference point is given by the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011959283
We study asymmetric first-price procurements with unobserved heterogeneity and asymmetric risk-aversion. For this model …, we propose a new empirical method that allows us to predict the expected procurement cost at any reserve price. Being …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846316
Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expectations. I analyze this expectation-based loss aversion in the context of dynamic and static auctions, where the reference point is given by the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update their reference point during the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846335
We consider a takeover setting in which bidders are risk averse and study aversion's consequences on their strategy. We found that when bidders are risk averse, under some conditions, their overbidding depends on the size of toeholds they hold. We show that there is a threshold under that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212411