Safer firms receive funding from reputable venture capitalists and offer new securities underwritten by reputable investment banks. We offer a new explanation for these facts employing a moral-hazard model in which a firm and an agent are matched endogenously. More reputable agent's effort has a...

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders and we investigate its properties. Budget...

We present a dynamic signaling model where wasteful education takes place over several periods of time. Workers pay an education cost per unit of time and cannot commit to a fixed education length. Workers face an exogenous dropout risk before graduation. Since low-productivity workers' cost is...

In this note, we consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined, and match quality is initially unknown. A large firm benefits from the opportunity of rotating workers so as to partially overcome mismatch loss. As a result, in the...

Liaoning is a granary province with a large agricultural population and great market potential. Expanding rural residents’ consumption becomes a necessity for enlarging domestic demand, solving three agriculture problems and promoting sustainable and rapid economic development. The...

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive...

We consider the impact of job rotation in a directed search model in which firm sizes are endogenously determined and match quality is initially unknown. A large firm benefits from the opportunity to rotate workers so as to partially overcome the loss of mismatch. As a result, in the unique...

Consider an all-pay auction with interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for the case of two players. In contrast with the second-price auction, making budgets more severe can depress the bids of unconstrained bidders