We show that larger trades incur lower trading costs in government bond markets (“size discount”), but costs increase in trade size after controlling for clients’ identities (“size penalty”). The size discount is driven by the cross-client variation of larger traders obtaining better...

Contrary to the prediction of the classic adverse selection theory, a more informed trader could receive better pricing relative to a less informed trader in over‑the‑counter financial markets. Dealers chase informed orders to better position their future quotes and avoid winner’s curse in...

We show that larger trades incur lower trading costs in government bond markets ('size discount'), but costs increase in trade size after controlling for clients’ identities (‘size penalty’). The size discount is driven by the cross‑client variation of larger traders obtaining better...

We show in a model of over-the-counter trading that customers in equilibrium may choose to contact very few dealers to incentivize maximum liquidity provision—“less is more.” This happens when dealers’ liquidity supply is sufficiently elastic to competition. This novel mechanism is...

Az energetikai szemléletváltás igénye a turisztikai ágazatban a minél gazdaságosabb üzemeltetésére való törekvésben, valamint a környezeti, társadalmi szempontok és növekvő elvárások érvényesítésében, gya­korlatban való alkalmazásában jelentkezik. A folyamatos...