Similar Search Results

Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard - 2012

situation, it gets alleviated easily when the situation allows a shifting of responsibility. -- Team production ; Trust ; Choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627384

Endogenous leadership in incentive contracts

Kim, Jaesoo - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 82 (2012) 1, pp. 256-266

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685013

Incentive contracts for teams : experimental evidence

Landeo, Claudia; Spier, Kathryn E. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011495886

Policing team production through job design

Valsecchi, Irene - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 12 (1996) 2, pp. 361-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001211624

Double inefficiency in optimally organized firms

Bös, Dieter - In: Journal of public economics 56 (1995) 3, pp. 355-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001176221

Optimierung der Qualität von Gruppenentscheidungen : ein simulationsbasierter Beitrag zur Principal-Agent-Theorie

Lindstädt, Hagen - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000947647

Birds of a feather : teams as a screening mechanism

Breton, Michèle (contributor); … - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993037

Corporate investment behavior with incomplete information : three essays

Ruckes, Martin E. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001409341

Delegation and Team Selection in Organizations : An Experimental Study

Hamman, John - 2018

chosen team composition. Experimental data supports the direction of the main predictions, though it shows how and why … participants deviate from expected behavior. In particular, it shows that managers selecting a team composition closer to the … optimal predictions delegate better and have higher payoffs. Deviations from the optimal team composition are consistent with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924939

Delegation to a group

Fehrler, Sebastian; Janas, Moritz - 2021

We study the choice of a principal to either delegate a decision to a group of careerist experts, or to consult them individually and keep the decision-making power. Our model predicts a trade-off between information acquisition and information aggregation. On the one hand, the expected benefit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012549435