Motivated by the literature on ``choice overload'', we study a boundedly rational agent whose choice behavior admits a \textit{monotone threshold representation}: There is an underlying rational benchmark, corresponding to maximization of a utility function $v$, from which the agent's choices...

Motivated by the rise of social media, we build a model studying the effect of an economy’s potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Provided consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), equilibrium dynamics...

We build a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Assuming consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), we analyze how qualitative and quantitative features of the...

This paper proposes a tractable model that allows us to analyze how agents' perception of relationships with others determines the structures of networks. In our model, agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their payoffs depend on the social distance between...

We study the implications of flexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of finite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to affect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise. The values of these state...

We investigate the effect of information lags in discrete time evolutionary game dynamics on symmetric games. At the end of each period, some players obtain information about the distribution of strategies among the entire population. They update their strategies according to this information....

We introduce and characterize a recursive model of dynamic choice that accommodates naiveté about present bias. The model incorporates costly self-control in the sense of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to overcome the technical hurdles of the Strotz representation. The important novel condition is...

This paper studies models of population game dynamics where players make stochastic choices because of payoff perturbations. The goal is to obtain deterministic equilibrium selection, where the action distribution in the population globally converges to Nash equilibria with probability 1 in a...