We study the implications of flexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of finite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to affect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise. The values of these state...

This paper studies models of population game dynamics where players make stochastic choices because of payoff perturbations. The goal is to obtain deterministic equilibrium selection, where the action distribution in the population globally converges to Nash equilibria with probability 1 in a...

We introduce and characterize a recursive model of dynamic choice that accommodates naivete about present bias. While recursive representations are important for tractable analysis of in nite-horizon problems, the commonly-used Strotz model of time inconsistency presents well-known technical...

We introduce and characterize a recursive model of dynamic choice that accommodates naivete about present bias. The model incorporates costly self-control in the sense of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to overcome the technical hurdles of the Strotz representation. The important novel condition is...

This paper proposes a tractable model that allows us to analyze how agents' perception of relationships with others determines the structures of networks. In our model, agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their payoffs depend on the social distance between...