Recent financial crisis has renewed attention on compensation schemes and their impact on risk-taking in depository institutions. Without ample theoretical and empirical backing, the recent policy proposals in the EU have suggested that long-term incentive plans that are closely linked to bank...

Bank CEOs are held personally accountable for firms' performance, including the downside risk. Operational risk is idiosyncratic and operational risk event announcements signal ineffective risk management. We examine the impact of operational risk announcements on different components of U.S....

In this paper we examine changes in the relationship between bank risk and the structure of bank CEO compensation following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Using a diff-in-diff methodology, we find significant differences between high and low pay-risk sensitivity banks....

This study predicts and finds that chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives induced by stock option compensation increase a bank’s contribution to systemic distress risk and systemic crash risk. We also predict and find that this CEO incentive–systemic risk relation operates...

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring US banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two...

The relationship between compensation, performance, and risk in a sample of Pakistani banks, using panel data for 20 banks from 2011 to 2021 has been examined in this research. To the best of researcher's knowledge, this is one of the first study examining the relationship between performance,...