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Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; García-Segarra, Jaume; Ritschel, … - 2018 - This version: June 2018

We present a novel design measuring a correlate of social preferences in a high-stakes setting. In the Big Robber Game, a "robber" can obtain large personal gains by appropriating the gains of a large group of "victims" as seen in recent corporate scandals. We observed that more than half of all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011880540

Trustworthy by convention

Bigoni, Maria; Stefania, Bortolotti; Marco, Casari; … - 2012

Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust relations involve multiple agents. In an experiment, we study a new setting called Collective Trust Game where there are multiple trustees, who may have an incentive to coordinate their actions. Trustworthiness has also a strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734290

Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment

Essen, Matt Van; Wooders, John - Economics Discipline Group, Business School - 2013

We explore the role of experience in mixed-strategy games by comparing, for a stylized version of Texas Hold-em, the behavior of experts, who have extensive experience playing poker online, to the behavior of novices. We find significant differences. The initial frequencies with which players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883512

Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games

Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin - CESifo - 2011

Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395307

Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games

Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M.T.; Strobel, Martin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people are able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient freedom to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009403395

Trustworthy by Convention

Bigoni, M.; Bortolotti, S.; Casari, M.; Gambetta, D. - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Alma Mater … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548540

Do Leaders Affect Ethical Conduct?

d'Adda, Giovanna; Darai, Donja; Weber, Roberto A. - CESifo - 2014

We study whether leaders influence the unethical conduct of followers. To avoid selection issues present in natural environments, we use a laboratory experiment in which we form groups and assign leadership roles at random. We study an environment in which groups compete, with dishonest behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812487

The Big Robber Game

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914390

Trustworthy by Convention

Bigoni, Maria; Bortolotti, Stefania; Casari, Marco; … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040845

How to Promote Cooperation for the Well-Being of Individuals and Societies

Capraro, Valerio - 2023

, cooperation is individually costly and, therefore, it often breaks down, leading to enormous social costs. In this article, I …. In iterated or non-anonymous interactions, I focus on the five rules of cooperation, as well as on structural changes …, involving the cost or the benefit of cooperation, or the size of the interacting group. In one-shot and anonymous interactions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014358292