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Between-group conflict and other-regarding preferences in nested social dilemmas

Böhm, Robert; Bornstein, Gary; Koppel, Hannes - 2014

conflicts. A first experiment shows that a between-group conflict leads to within-group cooperation and particularly individuals … personal costs of within-group versus collective cooperation, supporting the weighted average social preference theory by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369323

Between-group conflict and other-regarding preferences in nested social dilemmas

Böhm, Robert; Bornstein, Gary; Koppel, Hannes - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010756243

Between-group conflict and other-regarding preferences in nested social dilemmas

Böhm, Robert; Bornstein, Gary; Köppel, Hannes - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337030

Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions

Huang, Xiaochuan; Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; … - School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of … - 2014

to achieve cooperation in n-player prisoner's dilemma situations where each player has one behavioral type, either … cooperation. For heterogeneous behavioral type cases, we show that the benefits of cooperation shrink such that the unique outcome … cooperation rate in the stay-leave mechanism experiment is 86.6% across 15 periods, which increases to 96.0% after period 5. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188087

When best-replies are not in Equilibrium: Understanding Cooperative Behaviour

Wolff, Irenaeus - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz - 2013

equilibrium prediction that is based on the elicited conditional-cooperation preferences. Moreover, more often than not, beliefs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883484

Determinants of in-group bias: group affiliation or guilt-aversion?

Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo; Regner, Tobias - 2008

In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263886

The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies

Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - 2010

efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267122

Interior Collective Optimum in a Volontary Contribution to a Public-Goods Game : An Experimental Approach

Hichri, Walid - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

We run a public good experiment with four different treatments. The payoff function is chosen such that the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the collective optimum (CO) are both in the interior of the strategy space. We try to test the effect of varying the level of the collective optimum, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789654

The Provision of Public Goods with Positive Group Interdependencies

Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008472642

When In Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods

Carpenter, Jeffrey - 2002

We ask whether conformity, copying the most observed behavior in a population, can affect free riding in a public goods situation. Our model suggests that, if free riding is sufficiently frequent at the start of a public goods game, conformity will increase the growth rate of free riding. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005417024