The financial crisis that began in 2007 has brought to the fore the issues of excesses in lending, leverage, and risk-taking as some of the fundamental causes of this crisis. At the same time, in dealing with the financial crisis there have been large scale interventions by governments, often...

The literature on ownership structures has made continual use of notions such as cross-holdings and pyramids which are closely related to the vastly increasing network literature. We propose to transfer successfully applied network methods such as network graphs, the MAN-classification scheme,...

This study uses a comprehensive sample of 763 Chinese listed companies to explore the relationship between the extent of related party transactions and operational performance. The empirical results show that when the listed company is controlled by a related party, the higher the level of...

This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...

Privatisation issues are currently highly ranked in policy agendas in many transitional economies. Since, the delay in privatisation process and corporate restructuring are repeatedly mentioned as a serious obstacle that blocks the economic performance in these countries. This paper focuses on...

A simple algebraic model of a property structure leading to the Leontief-type input-output scheme is developed and used to eliminate indirect ownership relations and evaluate the final distribution of national property among individual owners. Concepts of "family capitalism" and "capitalism of...

This study highlights the ownership structure of 1120 Canadian listed firms. The chains of ownership and control are traced back to the ultimate controlling owners, and related to some corporate features. Families are the most prevalent type of controlling shareholder. Pyramids, multiple classes...

Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control is substantially enhanced by using pyramid structures and cross-holdings by firms in nine East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999, SSRN Working Paper; 2002, Journal of Finance 57(2),...

The paper models the relative prices of shares that differ only in their voting rights. The voting premium is derived as a function of the probability of takeover. We analyse how the voting premium is determined by the relative efficiency of the rival, the share structure, and by ownership...