Similar Search Results

The role of context and team play in cross-game learning

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009) 5, pp. 1101-1139

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003889757

Linking accounting, organizations, and institutions

Chapman, Christopher S.; Cooper, David J.; Miller, Peter B. - In: Accounting, organizations, and institutions : essays in …, (pp. 1-29). 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003870114

Understanding overbidding in second price auctions : an experimental study

Cooper, David J. (contributor); Fang, Hanming (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003468447

Communication, renegotiation, and the scope for collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003911901

Learning and transfer in signaling games

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 34 (2008) 3, pp. 415-439

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003607010

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 10 (2007) 3, pp. 269-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003608174

It's what you say, not what you pay : an experimental study of manager-employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J. - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 5 (2007) 6, pp. 1223-1268

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578545

Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations : an experimental study

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J. - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 9 (2006) 4, pp. 407-423

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003396079

Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams : forward induction or faster adaptive learning?

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 63 (2009) 4, pp. 216-224

Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho–Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943316

History dependence and the formation of social preferences : an experimental study

Cooper, David J.; Stockman, Carol Kraker - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 49 (2011) 2, pp. 540-563

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009007966