We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley (1962) mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Match- ing Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a...

We study the performance of two-sided matching clearinghouses in the laboratory. Our experimental design mimics the Gale-Shapley (1962) mechanism, utilized to match hospitals and interns, schools and pupils, etc., with an array of preference profiles. Several insights come out of our analysis....

We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large...

Most doctors in the NRMP match with one of their most-preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show...

Under regret theory, decision-makers derive utility both from the outcome of their chosen action and the counterfactual. Evidence for anticipatory regret aversion has been found in oneshot settings, with "regret lotteries" that always reveal outcomes, as a counterfactual on non-entry, being...