No abstract.

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In...

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We...

We consider several ordinal formulations of submodularity, defined for arbitrary binary relations on lattices. Two of these formulations are essentially due to Kreps [Kreps, D.M., 1979. A representation theorem for "Preference for Flexibility". Econometrica 47 (3), 565-578] and one is a...