n economy consisting of n=2 different types of consumers and one publicly owned natural monopoly is under consideration. The preferences of the consumers are assumed to be linear in money and the demand curves are assumed not to cross. We also suppose that the net utility from consumption is so...

An economy consisting of two different types of consumers and one publicly owned natural monopoly is under consideration. The preferences of the consumers are assumed to be linear in money and the demand curves are assumed not to cross. We also suppose that the net utility from consumption is so...

This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient...

We consider nonlinear pricing policies that are designed by a social welfare maximizer who operates under a non-negative profit requirement. In our two-type economy, we characterize the set of all feasible nonlinear pricing policies and the frontier of the utility possibility set. Our results...

We consider nonlinear pricing policies that are designed by a social welfare maximizer who operates under a non-negative profit requirement. In our two-type economy, we characterize the set of all feasible nonlinear pricing policies and the frontier of the utility possibility set. Our results...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...