This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the long-lived player. We provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium...

This paper studies robust Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in which the sender only has limited knowledge about the receiver's private information. The sender is ambiguity averse and has a maxmin expected utility function. We show that when the sender faces full ambiguity,...

This paper studies an information design problem in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers, whose valuation of firm's products is uncertain, observe a noisy signal about the valuation upon being matched with a firm. The goal is to characterize those signal structures that maximize...

This paper uses a mechanism design without transfer approach to investigate the optimal communication mechanism in a two-division organization. The principal, with perfect commitment power on multiple decision rules, wants decisions to be both adapted to local conditions and coordinated with...