Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...

There is a tenuous link between market efficiency and economic efficiency in that stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. We theoretically and empirically investigate this link in the context of CEO turnover. Our theoretical model predicts that, although the...

Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...

We analyze the market reaction to the sentiment of the CEO speech at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). As the AGM is typically preceded by several information disclosures, the CEO speech may be expected to contribute only marginally to investors' decision-making. Surprisingly, however, we...