This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on...

INTRODUCTION: The Brazilian private health insurance sector has operated since 1940’s without regulation. In 1998, the Brazilian Government stating the regulation of this sector. The reform improved the health insurance coverage level, stating no limit to physician visits and proibition to...

The effects of television advertising in the market for health insurance are of distinct interest to both firms and regulators. Regulators are concerned about firms potentially using ads to "cream skim," or attract an advantageous risk pool, as well as the potential for firms to use...

We study how inertia interacts with market power and adverse selection in managed competition health insurance markets. We use consumer-level data to estimate a model of the California ACA exchange, in which four firms dominate the market and risk adjustment is in place to manage selection. We...

This paper analyzes the German market for supplemental dental insurance (SuppDI) to identify selection behavior based on individuals’ private information. The rather limited underwriting by German private health insurers makes this market especially prone to selection effects. Although the...

In the backdrop of the low level of health insurance coverage in India, this study examines the determinants of the scaling-up process of health insurance by analyzing the rational behavior of an insurance agent facing a trade-off between selling ‘health insurance’ and ‘other forms of...

Implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been linked to an increase in the population covered by health insurance through expansions of the Medicaid program and revisions to private health insurance markets. We add to the body of literature on unintended consequences of the ACA by...

The empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed. The problem in assessing the extent of adverse selection is that private information, on which agents act, is generally unobservable to the researcher, which makes it difficult to distinguish between adverse selection and...

Micro data from a dental insurance natural experiment is used to analyze why agents opt out of insurance. The purpose is to relate the dropout decision to new information on risk, acquired by the policy holder and the insurer. The results show that agents tend to leave the insurance when...