We consider the issue of first versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or complements, dispensing with...

We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He may face competition by an entrant in the applications market. The platform monopolist can benefit from competition for three reasons. First, his profits from the platform...

We prove the existence of symmetric pure Cournot equilibria with heterogeneous goods under the following condition: each firm reacts to a rise in competirors output in such a way that its market price does not rise. This condition is not related to wether goods are strategic substitutes or...

We study in this paper how technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations depend on industry characteristics (demand function and cost parameters specific to the multiproduct flexible technology and to the product dedicated technologies) and on the observability conditions of...

The standard exposition of duopoly in most intermediate microeconomics texts relies heavily on simplifying assumptions of linearity, yet it remains algebraically somewhat dense. In this note, I outline an alternative graphical approach that makes use of the same assumptions, but which may be...

We investigate the possibility for two vertically related firms to at least partially collude on the wholesale price over an infinite horizon to mitigate or eliminate the effects of double marginalisation, thereby avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise alternative...

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

The present paper is concerned with providing a core model to address the issue of firms simultaneously competing in both prices and quantities (capacity levels) within a simple duopoly market setting where products are asymmetrically differentiated by endogenous quality location. A three-stage...