The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks' remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank's top executives, and why...

We analyze exclusive contracts between health care providers and insurers in a model where some consumers choose to stay uninsured. In case of a monopoly insurer, exclusion of a provider changes the distribution of consumers who choose not to insure. Although the foreclosed care provider remains...

This paper analyzes when it may be desirable for the government to stimulate open source software as a response to market failures in software markets. Our most important finding is that directly stimulating open source software, e.g. by acting as a lead customer, can improve dynamic efficiency...

Over the course of the past few years, too much credit has been made available worldwide, due to financial innovation, overly optimistic expectations and loophole-ridden regulation. Regulatory supervisors have failed because they were unable to prevent this situation. Things took a bad turn...

We construct a model for differentiated Cournot competition between service-based and infrastructure-based firms, out of which one infrastructure-based firm (the incumbent) supplies to the service-based firms. We seek for and compare the socially optimal and the incumbent’s profit maximizing...

We analyse the interplay between investigation policies, deterrence and desistance in a model where a competition authority monitors multiple sectors and faces a budget constraint that prevents it from deterring cartels in all sectors simultaneously. Most studies of competition law enforcement...