Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: coordinated pure equilibria in which everyone plays the same action, and inefficient mixed equilibria with miscoordination. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to one of the pure coordinated equilibria from almost any...

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma. By contrast, when k 1 we...

We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk-averse decision makers have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-term risky assets. Moreover, in each problem, the...

We study various decision problems regarding short‐term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk‐averse decision makers have the same (problem‐dependent) ranking over short‐term risky assets. Moreover, in each problem,...

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize’s location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e.,...

We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk-averse decision makers have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-term risky assets. Moreover, in each problem, the...

We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk-averse decision makers have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short- term risky assets. Moreover, in each of these...