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The hawk–dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play “hawk” and players in the other population play “dove,” and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models shows that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015266774
The hawk–dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play “hawk” and players in the other population play “dove,” and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models shows that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015267318
The hawk–dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play “hawk” and players in the other population play “dove,” and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models shows that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015268049
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: coordinated pure equilibria in which everyone plays the same action, and inefficient mixed equilibria with miscoordination. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to one of the pure coordinated equilibria from almost any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015269429
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: coordinated pure equilibria in which everyone plays the same action, and inefficient mixed equilibria with miscoordination. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to one of the pure coordinated equilibria from almost any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015269461
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: coordinated pure equilibria in which everyone plays the same action, and inefficient mixed equilibria with miscoordination. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to one of the pure coordinated equilibria from almost any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015270079
The hawk–dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play “hawk” and players in the other population play “dove,” and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models shows that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249192
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: coordinated pure equilibria in which everyone plays the same action, and inefficient mixed equilibria with miscoordination. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to one of the pure coordinated equilibria from almost any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014261482
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when k 1 we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015226068
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when k 1 we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229395