This handbook chapter appears in Antitrust Law & Economics (Keith Hylton, ed. 2010). It describes the role of market concentration in the legal framework for the antitrust review of horizontal mergers and evaluates the extent to which modern economic analysis supports a role for concentration in...

This chapter discusses the principal theoretical and practical problems of the economics of cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger. Because the new theoretical approaches are not easily modified to encompass welfare considerations, except in a very partial-equilibrium setting, the positive...

Most technical standards development organizations (SDOs) have adopted internal policies embodying “due process” criteria such as openness, balance of interests, consensus decision making, and appeals. Unlike other aspects of SDO governance, relatively little scholarly research has...

We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may...