We document that labor relationships at founder firms are less acrimonious than at non-founder firms. Founder-firms are less likely to be unionized and employees at non-unionized founder-firms are less likely to attempt to unionize. Further, among firms that are unionized, labor at founder-firms...

Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic...

Purpose: In this paper, the author attempts to answer an important question upon founder-CEOs' exiting: How do they sell their remaining ownership shares? The literature has largely been silent on this question, and therefore is missing an important piece of the puzzle on the final stage of the...

This paper shows that, in large US companies, founder-CEO and founder-family controlled firms experience about 10% more underpricing relative to non-founder firms during the IPO process. This result holds after controlling for the ownership of founders, and is consistent with the...

This study represents a first step in identifying the mathematics prerequisites for doctoral level studies in finance. We exploit the methodology of triangulation and complete the following three analyses. First, we completed an exhaustive search of the official web pages of all doctoral...

We study the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity, pay-risk sensitivity, and shareholder voting outcomes as part of the "say-on-pay" provision of the 2010 U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. Consistent with our hypothesis, we provide evidence that shareholders tend to approve of compensation...