Does banks' zombie lending induced by unconventional monetary policy also allow zombie firms to leverage their trade credit borrowing? We first provide evidence suggesting that - even in Germany - particularly weak banks used the European Central Bank's very long-term refinancing operations...

Does banks' zombie lending induced by unconventional monetary policy also allow zombie firms to leverage their trade credit borrowing? We first provide evidence suggesting that - even in Germany - particularly weak banks used the European Central Bank's very long-term refinancing operations...

Does banks’ zombie lending induced by unconventional monetary policy also allow zombie firms to leverage their trade credit borrowing? We first provide evidence suggesting that—even in Germany—particularly weak banks used the European Central Bank’s very long-term refinancing operations...

This paper provides evidence of deliberate private-information disclosure within banks' international business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover buy more stocks of the target firm prior to the deal announcement,...

This paper provides evidence of deliberate private-information disclosure within banks' international business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover buy more stocks of the target ffrm prior to the deal announcement,...

This paper provides evidence of deliberate private-information disclosure within banks’ international business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover buy more stocks of the target firm prior to the deal announcement,...

This paper provides evidence of deliberate private-information disclosure within banks' international business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover buy more stocks of the target firm prior to the deal announcement,...

This paper provides evidence of deliberate private information disclosure within banks' business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover acquire more stocks of the target firm prior to the deal announcement, enabling...

This paper provides evidence of deliberate private-information disclosure within banks' international business networks. Using supervisory trade-level data, we show that banks with closer ties to a target advisor in a takeover buy more stocks of the target ffrm prior to the deal announcement,...