In the present study we analyse the topic of coalition formation in multi-issue multilateral negotiations under … with the standard public choice theory predictions. In the first experiment we have shown that in a situation of 3-issues … cases does not arise. In experiment 2 we have shown that the adoption of the unanimity, instead of the majority, rule …

weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …

multiple majority coalitions (pivotality) or from the relative vote share the agent contributes to a coalition (proportionality …). We distinguish between coalitional commitment, where parties defer distributive bargaining when forming a coalition, and … allocative commitment, where allocations are determined at the point of coalition formation. We show how the timing of commitment …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …