This paper examines how a manager uses voluntary disclosure to influence corporate control by a short-term shareholder. Since a short-term shareholder intervenes excessively, the manager's disclosure strategy is determined by the trade-off between excessive and insufficient intervention. In...

Institutional investors have limited resources dedicated to engagement activities, yet, in manycases they hold thousands of stocks in their portfolios. We exploit the introduction of the tieringclassification system by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 2016 for signatories reportingunder...

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms...

How does the possibility of being taken over affect a manager’s voluntary disclosure? This paper analyzes this question in a setting where the manager’s disclosure complements the rival’s expertise and influences the probability the firm is taken over by a rival. The threat of being...

Using textual analysis methods, we investigate the information content of government financial disclosure and its implications. Specifically, we establish several stylized facts using the comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs) issued by municipal entities. We first document large...

We examine the impact of financial disclosures’ readability on future shareholder activism, as expressed by shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. Based on a sample of 1,560 proposals made by shareholders of 818 S& P 1500 firms between 2000 and 2014, we find that the semantic complexity of the...