While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U.S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period...

We study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply...

This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that...

To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle...

The paper explores the interdependencies between corporate and individual leniency programs. In a duopoly model where corporations are separated into representing owners and operating managers, conflicts between the two types of agents arise if the relative benefits of participating in the...

Cartels are generally acknowledged as one of the most serious forms of anti-competitive behaviour between competitors. Due to the fact that competition authorities have faced difficulties in enforcing their competition policy with respect to cartels, the leniency program represents a legal,...

The present assessment focuses on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is...

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate" leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Since 1996, the European Commission has been operating a leniency programme, under which companies cooperating with its cartel investigations can obtain immunity from fines or a reduction of fines. Leniency plays a prominent role in EU cartel enforcement today. This paper assesses the positive...

Competition authorities need a better understanding of the determinants of cartel self-reporting in order to increase cartel members’ incentives to apply for the benefit from leniency programs and thus improve the effectiveness of anti-cartel policy. Using information on 683 firm groups that...