can precisely compare the strength of intention- and distribution-based motives for reward/punishment. Doing so requires …

cooperation, coordination, and punishment in a variety of games. The model is consistent with abundant experimental evidence that …

We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a … a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either envious or selfish best explains the punishment from both third and …

choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining high …

endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining …

provision of public goods when punishment is possible or not. We find that compared to homogeneous groups, asymmetric valuations …

about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or …-order punishment increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the pattern of punishing, including its … past history, and opportunities to punish are unrestricted. Availability of higher-order punishment reduces cooperation and …

Punishment has been shown to be an effective reinforcement mechanism. Intentional or not, punishment will likely …: the voluntary contributions mechanism. We find that spillovers occur when others observe punishment outside their own … social dilemma. However, the direction of the spillover effect depends crucially on personal punishment history and whether …