Exploiting differential interstate branching deregulation across contiguous counties of adjacent states, we investigate the effect of entry threat on incumbent banks' loan loss provisions. Incumbents exposed to entry threat have offsetting incentives; lower provisions make their loan...

Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5%) exert governance through the threat of exit. Blockholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent...

Using a large hand-collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This...

We provide new evidence that firms appear to manage long-run earnings upward in order to manage rank and file employees' perceptions of employment security. In particular, we exploit exogenous state-level changes in unemployment insurance benefits and test for partial unwinding of prior upward...

Building on incomplete contract theory, I investigate whether the likelihood of renegotiating financial covenants is affected by the debt-contracting value of borrowers' accounting numbers (DCV). DCV captures the inherent ability of accounting numbers to predict credit quality. Using a large...

We test for changes in investment efficiency around a shock to financial reporting quality—the adoption of SFAS No. 123R, which requires that employee stock option (ESO) costs be recognized rather than disclosed at fair value. We predict and find a reduction in underinvestment for firms...

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to...

We examine the real effects of FAS 166 and FAS 167 on banks' loan-level mortgage approval and sale decisions. Effective in 2010, these standards tightened the accounting for securitizations and consolidation of securitization entities, respectively, causing banks to recognize an estimated $811...

Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks on lending corruption using a unique World Bank dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evidence consistent with timely...

Contracting parties, such as the firm and its supplier, have cost-reducing incentives to make investments which support the unique transactions between them. However, to the extent that one party may renege on its contractual obligations, the other party incurring the cost of the...