We empirically test delinking of waste dynamics with regard to economic growth and the effectiveness of environmental and specific waste-related policies, by exploiting a newly constructed, integrated waste-economic-policy dataset based on official data for the EU15 for 1995-2007. We find that...

We derive conditions of individual preferences and technology that give rise to a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental protection. We present a class of models (which captures a static model as well as an overlapping-generations model) in which individuals differ in...

International trade and environmental regulation are interdependent. Central and East European Countries (CEECs) are now being integrated in international markets, and the question arises how environmental issues should be taken account of during this process and which institutional framework is...

International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies on the size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain how national...

Evidence suggests that a surprisingly large fraction of firms comply with pollution emission standards even though expected penalities for noncompliance are low. We offer an explanation of this puzzle by extending the standard model of enforcement to include a self-seporting requirement and...

The literature suggests that democracy positively affects environmental policy stringency. Using the method of propensity score matching, we find that this result appears to be largely driven by the parliamentary democracies (as opposed to the presidential-congressional, proportional or majority...

This paper studies the influence of invironmental policies on environmental quality, domestic firms, and welfare.

This paper has examined the different approaches used by courts to adjudicate liability when two or more individuals jointly cause the external damages.

This paper analyses the importance of informational asymmetries in international environmental regulation by use of a game theoretic approach of signalling games.