strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly …In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how … of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask …

strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly …In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how … of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask …

group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value …

iterative coalition formations where players use their power to form alliances and eliminate others without formal commitment …We study why a ruling minority (the elite) inevitably emerges from power struggles. Power struggles are modeled as …. We show that when players can strategically relinquish power, i.e., burn power, it allows a vested interested group to …

the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU … of power. We analyze the allocation rules called Position value (Meessen (1988) and Borm et al. (1992)) and graph … yet, we find that the graph-chi-value does not differ for networks referring to the same coalition while the Position …

vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed. …

commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the …We study the formation of a ruling coalition in nondemocratic societies where institutions do not enable political … individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members …

parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition government. However, the clauses also introduce distortions and modify the … necessary to measure the difficulties in forming a coalition government and to quantify the effects of electoral thresholds on … these difficulties. For this issue, we introduce a concept based on cooperative game theory which takes into account the …

Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power … measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting subjects reduce or eliminate extraneous forces. Logrolling remains as … values. The SSPI can serve as a control for power imbedded in voting blocs, permitting fuller analysis of other factors that …

the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming …Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use …. For normalised indices strategic rejection may increase power. Our notion of a strategic power index is well defined if …