We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign a finite number of goods to a group of ex ante heterogeneous agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities of money, which may naturally arise in environments where agents have different wealth...

We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign multiple units of an indivisible good to a group of agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities of money, which implies that utility is not perfectly transferable between them. Heterogeneous...

I study the relationship between data and market power in a duopoly model of price discrimination with search frictions. One firm receives a signal about the valuation of any arriving consumer while its rival receives no information. A share of consumers, who I name directed searchers, have...

We build a theoretical model to study how the widespread availability of data to firms affects the transmission of monetary policy and aggregate uncertainty. The presence of data strengthens the investment channel of monetary policy and can amplify cyclical fluctuations. Because data helps firms...

We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign a finite number of goods to a group of ex ante heterogeneous agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities of money, which may naturally arise in environments where agents have different wealth...

We study information sharing between competing sellers in markets where consumers sample sellers sequentially. Sellers can disclose to their rival when they encounter a specific buyer. Providing this information, which we call search disclosure, can enable all forms of search history-based price...