Issuers increasingly employ advisory firms (e.g. Moelis, Rothschild) to select underwriters, negotiate spreads and provide oversight during IPOs. We examine whether such advisers affect underpricing. Concealed within weak aggregate effects, we find significant heterogeneity amongst adviser...

We study a UK fund that acts as a liquidity provider for investors in small-cap stocks. Investors tender their holdings in exchange for shares in the fund. The fund has no say in which stocks it receives and earns fees liquidating the portfolio and returning cash within a three-year period. We...

The literature on IPO allocations assumes that investors bid their true demand in bookbuilding, or alternatively that all orders are uniformly inflated. We propose a model in which investors face uncertainty with respect to the aftermarket performance of the IPO and the number of shares they...

The literature on IPO allocations assumes that investors bid their true demand in bookbuilding, or alternatively that all orders are uniformly inflated. We propose a model in which investors face uncertainty with respect to the aftermarket performance of the IPO and the number of shares they...

Firms increasingly appoint independent advisers in IPOs alongside underwriters. We explore why, and we formulate a selection model. Controlling for issuer-adviser matching, we find advisers in aggregate have no effect on first-day returns, withdrawals, or fees paid to underwriters. However,...