The static model of two sided markets proposed by Rochet and Tirole analyses optimal pricing of a monopolistic platform at the equilibrium point. Their framework implicitly assumes that for each prices set by the platform, the equilibrium number of users on each side will be unique. However,...

Fee discrimination is commonly used by marketplace platforms (e.g., Amazon, eBay, and Uber). To better understand how marketplace fee discrimination interacts with the hybrid platform business model, we model a marketplace platform that manages fees and categories across a continuum of retail...

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile-phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes the providers of the content consumer purchase to either reduce their prices or...

Online platforms have become one of the most important business models of the digital economy and likely counteracted some of the drop in economic activity during the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, platform markets are subject to controversial debates about market power and the need for...

Although there could be a danger of generalizing and simplifying complex economic questions through bold statements, the digital economy is prone to discrimination and self-favoring. Not only do such allegations arguably form the core of EU-antitrust cases as Google Shopping and Amazon, but the...

The competitive strategies of `gatekeeper' platforms are subject to enhanced scrutiny. For instance, Apple and Google are being accused of charging excessive access fees to app providers and privileging their own apps. Some have argued that such allegations make no economic sense when the...

The most pressing debates in antitrust today center on major platforms like Amazon, Google, and Facebook. Platform markets are subject to strong network effects, which tend to create barriers to entry and reinforce market power. Frequently, the only way for a new platform to enter the market...

In this paper, we examine how the introduction of network externalities impact an open and vertically integrated platform's post-merger contractual relationship with third-party sellers distributing through its marketplace. Regardless of whether the platform uses linear contracts or two-part...

We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He may face competition by an entrant in the applications market. The platform monopolist can benefit from competition for three reasons. First, his profits from the platform...

This article studies competition between different types of ad-funded platforms attracting consumers with free services. Consumers often find advertisements a nuisance on such platforms. We study how under a competitive setting platforms balance the tension between attracting consumers and rent...