Showing 161 - 170 of 114,924
Decision makers lacking crucial specialist know-how often consult with better informed but biased experts. In our model …, and to situations with multiple experts and uncertainty about the size of the expert's bias. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008758925
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933710
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008701389
This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008906024
The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009517819
Evidence on behavior of experts in credence goods markets raises an important causality issue: Do "fair prices" induce … "good behavior", or do "good experts" post "fair prices"? To answer this question we propose and test a model with three … selection and fixed effects regressions support the model's predictions and show that causality goes from good experts to fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009536497
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571158
Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479932
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436518