In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyers regarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the...

We model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy. The borrower under-reports with a positive probability in the successful state, and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure.

Whether a microfinance institution should use a state-contingent repayment or not is very important since a state-contingent loan can provide insurance for borrowers. However, the classic Grameen bank used state non-contingent repayment, which is puzzling since it forces poor borrowers to make...

This paper offers a theory of development which links the degree of market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. At early stages of development, the presence of indivisible projects limits the degree of risk-spreading (diversification) that the economy can achieve. The desire to...

We analyse an economy where production is subject to moral hazard. The degree of the incentive (agency) costs introduced by the presence of moral hazard naturally depends on the information structure in the economy; it is cheaper to induce correct incentives in a society which possesses better...

Liquid markets where agents have limited capacity to sign exclusive contracts, as well as imperfect knowledge of previous transactions by others, raise the following risk: An agent can promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. I show that in such markets an...

This paper focuses on the pre-establishment period of start-ups in industrial districts. The industrial architecture is what I call a "rationed agglomeration" in which some entrepreneurs gather around an established firm while other entrepreneurs in the same business stand alone. In a rationed...

We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded) bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions that favor each system with the historical conditions prevailing when these financial systems evolved during...

This paper shows that subsidising the cost of capital restricts the ability of the poorest to participate in the group lending mechanisms that include saving opportunities. We document the group lending mechanism used by a typical microfinance lender in Haryana, India. Individuals can...

Empirical research on the impact and determinants of group lending is by now substantial. However, very little is known about the possible role of collateral to mitigate incentive problems in group lending. This is because microcredit programs have normally been implemented in rural areas of...