In this paper, I develop a model of self-reinforcing financial fads in which feedback patterns arise because of limitations to traders' observational learning. I assume that the traders categorize price history into finite groups of price patterns due to their cognitive limitations, but their...

We develop a new methodology for estimating the importance of herd behavior in financial markets. Specifically, we build a structural model of informational herding that can be estimated with financial transaction data. In the model, rational herding arises because of information-event...

We investigate the formation of market prices in a new experimental setting involving multi-period call-auction asset markets with state-dependent fundamentals. We are particularly interested in two informational aspects: (1) the role of traders who are informed about the true state and/or (2)...

One of the enduring principles of federal securities regulation is the mantra that bonds are securities, while commercial loans are not. Yet the corporate bond and loan markets in the U.S. are rapidly converging, putting significant pressure on the disparity in their regulatory treatment. As...

During currency crises, large traders once simultaneously short the asset markets and currency market. We study the large trader's information manipulation in crises by introducing a large trader in an asset market and a currency-attack coordination game with imperfect information. The asset...

I develop a new mechanism that exploits the leakage of information in financial markets to deliver herding and contrarian behavior, which I label “path-dependent behavior”. The mechanism is related to the role of word-of mouth communication in transmitting information about stocks among...

As expectations are driven by information, its selection is central in explaining common knowledge building and unraveling in financial markets. This paper addresses this information selection problem by proposing imitation as a key mechanism to explain opinion dynamics. Behavioral and cognitive...

In a multi-asset market where agents have both payoff and supply signals, the rational expectations equilibria with partially revealing prices are characterized by an algebraic Riccati equation. The equation states that asset prices’ payoff informativeness equals the aggregation of...

This study proposes a tractable imperfectly competitive economy where traders are socially connected with each other via an information network. We investigate the impact of information linkages on market equilibrium outcomes. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, we establish the existence...

Informational aspect of financial equilibrium has received much attention in the past three decades. In particular, two main frameworks have become canonical models in information asymmetries of financial market: (i) Grossman and Stiglitz model, (ii) Kyle model. Although these two different...