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Halal certification for financial products : a transaction cost perspective

Hayat, Raphie; Butter, Frank A. G. den; Kock, Udo - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720706

Image concerns and the provision of quality

Friedrichsen, Jana - 2013

choice and thereby increase the product's value to others. A monopolist restricts the product portfolio and charges price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227729

Umbrella branding and the provision of quality

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2006

Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365881

Image concerns and the provision of quality : conference paper

Friedrichsen, Jana - 2014

increase the product's value to others. A monopolist restricts the product portfolio and charges price premia to allocate image …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483881

Honest certification and the threat of capture

Strausz, Roland - 2004

that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2) Honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a … natural monopoly. 3) Price competition tends to a monopolization. The results derive from a general principle of reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343969

Voluntary Quality Disclosure Under Price-Signaling Competition

Caldieraro, Fabio - 2011

known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price …, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not … only the high-quality firm, but also the low-quality firm chooses to disclose its product quality to soften the price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121803

Imperfect Certification

Gu, Yiquan - 2008

This paper proposes a model for a certification market with an imperfect testing technology. Such a technology only assures that whenever two products are tested the higher quality product is more likely to pass than the lower quality one. When only one certifier with such testing technology is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722369

Umbrella Branding and External Certification

Hakenes, Hendrik - 2008

In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724659

Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in Quality

Belleflamme, Paul - 2007

According to standard economic wisdom, asymmetric information about product quality leads to a quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012730906

Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure

Daughety, Andrew F. - 2007

; alternatively, if a firm does not disclose its safety then consumers can attempt to infer its safety from the price charged. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731013