This paper examines the recent rise of institutional investment in the single-family home rental market and its implications for renters' welfare. Using institutional mergers to identify local exogenous variation in institutional landlords' scale and market share, we show that rent increased in...

We examine preference evolution under different marriage market arrangements, when preferences are influenced by own choices and parents' preferences. The dynamical system exhibits pitchfork bifurcation as the degree of sorting varies: Multiple stable equilibria arise under sufficiently random...

This paper experimentally studies the role of a compromise option in a repeated battle-of-the-sexes game. We find that in a random-matching environment, compromise serves as an effective focal point and facilitates coordination, but fails to improve efficiency. However, in a fixed-partnership...

We study the implications of two different matching mechanisms: bargaining in match (BIM) and binding agreement in the matching market (BAMM) in the context of cultural selection. Under BIM, matching across cultures is not operated through a well-regulated market, where agents' payoffs are not...

We develop a new model of the intergenerational transmission of culture based on the labor market characteristics of different cultural types. Following Borjas (1994, 1995) we assume that cultural heterogeneity increases labor productivity due to skill complementarities, however following...

This paper investigates the emergence of cooperation in a heterogeneous population. The population is divided into two cultural groups. Agents in the population are randomly matched in pairs to engage in a prisoner dilemma. The matching process is assortative, that is, cooperators are more...

This paper generalizes the discrete cultural transmission model proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2001) to continuous trait space. The resulting cultural evolutionary dynamic can be characterized by a continuous imitative dynamic in a population game in which a player's payoff is equal to the...

We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market with transfers (Koopmans and Beckmann,1957; Shapley andShubik,1972; Becker,1973). Some theoretical predictions align with but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching,...