Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 140,324
Cover Image
Performance Contingencies in CEO Equity Awards and Debt Contracting
Bizjak, John M. - 2018
We find that firms that grant performance-contingent (p-c) equity awards with accounting-based vesting conditions to their CEOs have lower cost of debt and less restrictive loan terms. The benefits of p-c accounting awards on debt financing are greater when the moral hazard problem faced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934578
Cover Image
Performance-Based Vesting Compensation and Debt Contracting
King, Tao-Hsien Dolly - 2019
This paper examines whether the risk-taking incentives induced by performance-based vesting (p-v) compensation influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based compensation, as measured by the proportion of grant date...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865414
Cover Image
Trading away incentives
Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Xia, Shuo - 2022 - This draft: October 19, 2022
, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of … motives in managers' portfolio choices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812
Cover Image
CEO compensation : evidence from the field
Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021
We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217
Cover Image
The Influence of CEO Power on Compensation Contract Design
Abernethy, Margaret A. - 2015
We investigate if CEO power influences a firm's decision to change its compensation system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess if CEO power influences the choice of performance measures as a form of camouflage to minimize the impact of these reforms on their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032118
Cover Image
A Primer on Tractable Incentive Contracts
Edmans, Alex - 2011
This note is a brief, non-technical summary of a framework that delivers tractable incentive contracts in broad settings that require few restrictions on the utility function, cost function and noise distribution, and are achievable in discrete time. The framework was developed in Edmans and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123391
Cover Image
Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts
Sepe, Simone M. - 2013
viewing managers as common agents of several types of investors can better capture the reality of corporate relationships …, where incentive problems can arise both vertically - between each investor type and the managers - and horizontally - among … making the undertaking of value-decreasing projects costly for managers and investors alike, conversion and/or redemption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094987
Cover Image
Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting
Walker, David I. - 2010
Executive equity compensation in the U.S. is evolving. At the turn of the millennium, stock options dominated the equity pay landscape, accounting for over half of the aggregate ex ante value of senior executive pay at large public companies, while restricted stock and similar compensation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013151751
Cover Image
Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy - 2016
We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864825
Cover Image
Incentives, Termination Payments, and CEO Contracting
Gillan, Stuart - 2017
pay. Further, holdbacks are positively associated with abnormal compensation, consistent with arguments that managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012958840