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Governance Thresholds, Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance : Evidence from the UK

Bos, Sebastian; Pendleton, Andrew; Toms, Steve - 2013

The paper examines the relationship between managerial share ownership and firm performance for British stock-exchange listed firms. We seek to establish a link between the predictions of agency theory and the corporate control environment using key governance and disclosure thresholds as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185326

Corporate Governance, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance

Core, John E.; Holthausen, Robert W.; Larcker, David F. - 2011

firms with more entrenched managers or poorer governance systems perform worse …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222388

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

Ang, James S.; Cole, Rebel A.; Lin, James W - 2008

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051339

Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance

Long, Michael S.; Walkling, Ralph A. - 2011

principal (target firm shareholders) and agent (target firm managers) are often in conflict. Moreover, the actions and stated … rationale of target managers in resisting or not resisting tender offers are readily observable, and the size of the possible …'s managers. The relationships between managerial actions and bid premium size, bidder nationality, conglomerate offers, and "ex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057020

The Role of Outside Shareholders, Outside Boards, and Management Entrenchment in CEO Selection

Park, Sangsoo; Rozeff, Michael S. - 2006

Large outside shareholders, outside boards, and management entrenchment influence the choice of inside or outside CEOs. In a sample of 385 CEO changes from 1979 to 1986, the probability of selecting an outside CEO rises with the level of stock ownership of large outside shareholders and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058190

Boards, CEO Entrenchment and the Cost of Capital

Dow, James - 2013

Existing research on CEO turnover focuses on CEO ability. This paper argues board ability is also important. Corporate boards will be reluctant to replace CEOs as this makes financing expensive by sending a negative signal about board ability. This differs from existing literature: entrenchment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041230

Does the reputation mechanism apply to independent directors in emerging markets? : evidence from China

Luo, Jin-hui; Liu, Yue - In: China journal of accounting research : CJAR 16 (2023) 1, pp. 1-28

We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets, using data from China. Firms with such directors, measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms, have higher profitability, operating efficiency and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014281507

Financial Debt Contracting and Managerial Agency

Imbierowicz, Björn; Streitz, Daniel - 2022

This paper analyzes how lenders address managerial agency problems in loan contracts using sweep covenants. Sweeps require a (partial) prepayment when triggered and are included in many contracts. Exploiting exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to brokerage house mergers and closures, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014361492

Accounting Rules? Stock Buybacks and Stock Options : Additional Evidence

Griffin, Paul A. - 2010

expectations - that buybacks impose option-induced agency costs on outside shareholders, and that managers benefit from weak …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141482

CEO pay and family firm heterogeneity : a behavioral agency model perspective

Fernández Méndez, Carlos; Arrondo García, Rubén; … - In: Business research quarterly : BRQ 27 (2024) 4, pp. 423-442

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm's generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015076326