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Incentives and Restrictions in Venture Capital Contracts

Anita, Lovas - 2016

In venture capital markets, contracts between investors and enterprises stipulate special incentives and restrictions in order to address the occurrence of severe asymmetric information, to reduce investor risk, and to facilitate successful exits. The purpose of this paper is to provide an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995899

How do Ex-Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?

Rau, P. Raghavendra - 2012

post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116288

How Do Ex-Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?

Rau, P. Raghavendra - 2013

post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089564

Do Acquirer CEO Incentives Impact Mergers?

Becher, David - 2014

This paper examines the mechanisms by which acquirer CEOs are incentivized and their impact on merger decisions. We argue that the pre-merger structure of CEO wealth impacts a CEO's risk tolerance and ultimately her willingness to undertake a merger as well as the framework of the deal. As the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065780

Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets : Empirical Evidence from China

Wang, Jiwei - 2013

performance because cross-subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong firms accountable for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074547

Agency Cost of CEO Perquisite in the Bank Loan Contracts

Chan, Chia-Ying - 2017

This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964677

Corporate Cash Holdings and CEO Compensation Incentives

Liu, Yixin - 2010

We examine the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests may influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150559

Value-Risk Tradeoffs and Managerial Incentives

Tsui, David - 2018

managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk … aversion creates potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. I also find that firms provide managers with … idiosyncratic (rather than systematic) risk and managers are more risk-averse. Collectively, these results suggest that firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936802

Managerial Incentives Explanation of Equity Carve-Outs Initial Returns

Seistrajkova, Biljana - 2017

This paper studies the first day return of 227 carve-outs during 1996-2013. I find that the first day return of newly issued subsidiary stocks is explained by the reporting distortions in the pre IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives and directors of the subsidiary received stock...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970504

Independent Director Reputation Incentives : The Supply of Monitoring Services

Masulis, Ronald W. - 2017

Extensive research finds that shareholder and CEO preferences affect demand for director services. We find a large body of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation incentives vary across firms and over time,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974592