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Hedge Markets for Executives and Corporate Agency

Ozerturk, Saltuk - 2006

This paper analyzes the implications of executive hedge markets for firm value maximization in an optimal contracting framework. The main results are as follows: without any hedging ability, the manager underinvests in risk at the firm level to diversify his own compensation risk. If the manager...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057269

Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

Buffa, Andrea M - 2019

We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced … distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight …. Noise traders bias prices upward because constraints make it harder for managers to underweight overvalued assets, which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904735

Sorting effects of performance pay

Goldmanis, Maris; Ray, Korok - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 61 (2015) 2, pp. 335-353

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490876

Board incentives and board independence in dynamic agency

Katolnik, Svetlana; Kukec, Sandra K.; Schöndube, Jens … - 2015

Efficiency of the board structure is usually perceived as linked to a higher degree of monitoring. If monitoring improves performance measurement signals, on which a manager is compensated, it can be considered desirable from the manager's point of view. As a result, having a low degree of board...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011429999

Merger performance and managerial incentives

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2014

We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291

Disciplining and screening top executives

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2006

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349199

An activist view of CEO compensation

Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017

Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307

Merger efficiency and managerial incentives

Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514

Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device

Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2011

This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348626

The Role of Compensation Contracts in Shaping Conservative Accounting : Evidence from Executive Clawback Provisions

Choi, Ahrum; Lee, Sam (Sunghan); Oh, Peter (Seung Hwan); … - 2023

We examine whether executive compensation contracts affect conservative accounting. Managers, on the one hand, may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014350210