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Managerial Incentives and Strategic Use of Information

Papiashvili, Nino - 2011

This paper studies how managerial incentives determine strategic transfer of information from managers to investors. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121265

Executive Compensation in a Changing Environment : Cautious Investors and Sticky Contracts

Cosimano, Thomas F. - 2012

We study dynamic incentive contracts in a continuous-time agency model with productivity switching between two unobserved states, about which an investor may learn by deviating from the myopically optimal action. The optimal contract balances short-run profits from myopic actions and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109124

Structural Investigation of Acquiring Managers' Incentives in Takeovers

Li, Di - 2012

structural method and calculating shareholder valuations from stock market reactions to takeovers, I find that acquiring managers … overvalue targets by 63% of target capitalization. As a result, acquiring managers pick targets that provide no synergy gains in … 17% of takeovers and overbid by 13% of target capitalization in the rest. Private benefits sought by acquiring managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109126

Entrenchment or Incentive? CEO Employment Contracts and Acquisition Decisions

Zhao, Jing - 2013

A long-standing controversy is whether CEO employment contracts insulate inferior managers from discipline leading to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083291

Golden Parachutes, Takeover Incentive, and Risk-Taking

Chen, Dong - 2014

We examine the relations between golden parachutes (GPs), pay-performance sensitivity (delta), and managerial risk-taking. We find an insignificant effect of GPs, but a negative and significant interaction of GPs with delta, on risk-taking. These results are consistent with the “takeover...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065544

Incentive Contracts are Not Rigged by Powerful CEOs

Wan, Kam-Ming - 2014

Morse, Nanda and Seru (2011) interpret the data to suggest that more powerful CEOs ex-post change their incentive contracts more. My paper points out a number of issues with their inference. First and most importantly, MNS do not control for the fact that not just the most powerful but almost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065835

The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts

Lund, Andrew - 2014

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068058

Subjective CEO Pay and Long-Term Incentives

Ma, Fangyuan - 2019

I find that corporate boards frequently link CEO compensation to subjective performance measures that are neither accounting ratios nor stock returns. Subjective measurement incorporates soft information privately observed by the board about the CEO's contribution to long-term firm value. I show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895181

Who’s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives

Gilje, Erik - 2019

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which common ownership shifts managers' incentives to internalize …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899520

Board Monitoring, CEO Incentives, and Shareholder Activism

Keusch, Thomas - 2018

This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less subject to relative performance evaluation (RPE) but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936387