The largest shareholder of an issuing firm in Hong Kong can be the underwriter for rights offers and open offers. We hypothesize that being an underwriter the largest shareholder who possesses more information is better than investment banks in certifying firm value and we find the evidence to...

Using 1043 IPOs from January 1997 to June 2002, we examine whether syndicate participation is reciprocal and also whether such reciprocity is beneficial to issuers. Our empirical results show that reciprocal syndicates appear to make a lower level of price revision (lower information...

Using a sample of 779 Japanese IPOs over the 2002-2012 period, we find a strong retail orientation in new share allocation. As for institutional allocation, the most complete universal banking form of underwriting neither advantages nor disadvantages investors in affiliated mutual funds, both...

This paper examines the impact of incentive fees in mitigating conflicts of interest between the IPO firms and their underwriters. Consistent with cost minimisation hypothesis, our results show that granting incentive fees to underwriters results in lower listing costs and high IPO proceeds. We...

We examine the price discovery process of initial public offerings (IPOs) from the offer price to the first day’s open price. Stock exchanges have made major changes to the IPO preopening process, and introduced an open auction process in which all investors are able to enter orders and...

Using a novel measure of marketing during initial public offering (IPO) roadshows, we find that marketing positively predicts underpricing, price revisions, and post-IPO liquidity, but has little effect on fees. We further show that IPO roadshow duration and marketing intensity have decreased...

Is there quid pro quo in auctioned IPOs - an alternative to bookbuilding in U.S. and elsewhere? Using proprietary data on uniform-pricing IPO auctions from China, we show when the share allocation rule shifted from pro rata to lottery draw (that makes quid pro quo valuable to a bidder), fund...

The literature suggests that underwriters perform significant marketing functions in securities offerings. We argue that underwriter’s efforts related to marketing can be estimated by the abnormal component of IPO underwriting spread. This is feasible using a large sample of Chinese IPOs,...

This paper presents evidence using Japanese data that shows that the principal–agent problem between underwriter and issuing firms is the cause of the underpricing of initial public offerings. We find that the initial return is lower when the venture capital is a subsidiary of the lead...

Sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act address a potential conflict of interest by banning commercial banks from the market for corporate securities underwriting. This restriction was officially rescinded in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act. In turn, this...