. With group measures, only team success is rewarded, but cooperation is more costly in the higher productive states when the … measures, the principal can replicate the group performance measure or induce competition, and in both cases prefers no …

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when …

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability.  Risk-neutral managers may not …

. The results favor the team perspective under which unilateral shirking is assumed infeasible for managers. The analysis … compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses …-based measures of agency costs. The risk premium can explain up to 37% of total compensation for higher-paid managers in large firms …

. The results favor the team perspective under which unilateral shirking is assumed infeasible for managers. The analysis … compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses …-based measures of agency costs. The risk premium can explain up to 37% of total compensation for higher-paid managers in large firms …

with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate …, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with … managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but …