Narrow search
Showing 71 - 80 of 148,689
Cover Image
CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Policy
Chi, Sabrina - 2014
This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax avoidance. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056948
Cover Image
The Presence, Value, and Incentive Properties of Relative Performance Evaluation in Executive Compensation Contracts
Bettis, J. Carr - 2014
Using data that includes specific contractual details of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts granted to executives for 1,833 firms for the period 1998 to 2012, we develop new methods to characterize RPE awards and measure their value and incentive properties. The frequency in the use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059189
Cover Image
Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592
Cover Image
Competitive Target Pay Practices for CEO Compensation
Ferrari, Mascia; O'Byrne, Stephen F.; Rajgopal, Shivaram; … - 2022
The competitive target pay policy sets a target amount of total compensation within a specified range of the amount paid to executive peers. If such a policy were widely adopted by compensation committees, we would observe a negative cross-sectional association between the stock price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403344
Cover Image
Are CEOs Compensated for Value Destroying Growth in Earnings?
Balachandran, Sudhakar V. - 2011
Prior research shows that firms generating earnings growth by improving profitability create shareholder value, while firms generating earnings growth through investment destroy value. This paper examines whether compensation committees consider this while determining CEO compensation. We first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132985
Cover Image
The Endogeneity of Executive Compensation and its Impact on Management Discretionary Behavior Over Financial Reporting
Sun, Lan - 2012
endogeneity exists in that fixed compensation and salaries provide disincentives for managers to practice aggressive earnings … management whereas at-risk compensation and bonuses induce managers to employ income-increasing discretionary accruals to inflate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097791
Cover Image
What Form of Relative Performance Evaluation?
Celentani, Marco; Loveira, Rosa - 2004
We study relative performance evaluation in executive compensation when executives have private information about their ability. We assume that the joint distribution of an individual firm's profit and market movements depends on the ability of the executive that runs the firm. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029114
Cover Image
Market competition and executive pay : increased competition affects the pay incentives firms provide to their managers and may also affect overall pay structures
Ferreira, Priscila - 2015
pay and performance. To the extent that product-market competition can affect the incentive schemes offered by firms to … their executives, the analysis of the effects of competition on the structure of compensation may be informative for policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011427661
Cover Image
Social comparison and optimal contracts in competition for managerial talent
Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus - 2020
We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for … if the degree of competition for talent is sufficiently low. In contrast, a ranking unambiguously reduces welfare if the … competition intensity is high and agents suffer from lagging behind while it can enhance welfare (depending on the fraction of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253115