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Consumer protection may induce some socially undesirable outcomes in a competitive bidding environment. In an auction with costly participation, we show that the possibility of default may cause social welfare loss through two channels. One is the possibility of no trade when a default occurs,...
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A seller wants to allocate an indivisible product among a number of potential bidders by a finite deadline, and to contact a bidder, she needs to incur a search cost. We show that the seller's optimal search outcomes can be implemented by a sequential search auction, which is characterized by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852747
In a framework of sequential search, we define a decision maker’s time preference, which is endogenous to her optimal decisions and the environment. The induced time preference is non-stationary and context-dependent, which supports key empirical and experimental evidence, such as...
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We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
Knowledge sharing has multifaceted effects on organizations, such as improving work performance, among which creativity is apparently one of the most important parts. Nevertheless, the effects of knowledge sharing on individuals has not been paid attention sufficiently by previous research....
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We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a first-price public procurement auction. In our model, firms are invited into the auction at positive costs, and a bureaucrat runs the auction on behalf of a government, who may request a bribe from the winning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999794