We develop an agent based model of traditional banks and asset managers. Our aim is to investigate the channels of contagion of shocks to asset prices within and between the two financial sectors, including the effects of fire sales and their impact on financial institutions’ balance sheets....

The paper focuses on two functions of shadow banking: securitization and collateral intermediation. It describes operations of the shadow banking system, demand factors, systemic risks, and associated policy priorities

Shadow banking is the creation or transfer – by banks and non-bank intermediaries – of bank-like risks outside the banking system. In Italy the shadow banking system is fully regulated, mostly following the principle of same business-same rules or ‘bank-equivalent regulation'. After an...

We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. Demandable deposits impose market discipline: Without shadow banking, traditional banks optimally pursue a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. Shadow banking...

We analyze the effect of bank capital requirements on the structure and risk of a financial system where markets, regulated banks, and shadow banks coexist. Banks face a moral hazard problem in screening entrepreneurs' projects, and they choose whether to be regulated or not. If regulated, a...

Bank holding companies invest in risky projects through regulated bank entities and sell projects for a fee, thus engaging in shadow banking. To increase the fee income, BHCs guarantee sold projects with bank proceeds. When demand for financial assets is high, BHCs expand their own bank...

This paper studies a banking model of maturity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the coexistence of regulated commercial banks and unregulated shadow banks. We derive three main results: First, the relative size of the shadow banking sector determines the stability of the...

We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines marketdiscipline on traditional banks. Depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crisesimposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safeportfolio strategy to prevent early...