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We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010505157
Do established parties change political institutions to disadvantage smaller, nonmainstream parties if the latters ́electoral prospects improve? We study this question with a natural experiment from the German federal state of Hesse. The experiment is the abolishment of an explicit electoral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010505165
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) swept the 2014 General Elections in India and emerged as a single party with absolute majority, a result not witnessed since 1984. Not only did it win a majority of seats, it also managed to increase its vote share in almost all states between 2009 and 2014....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423882
This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301144
. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334365
Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229
political agency setting. In the baseline two-period case where only the politician's actions are observable before the election … probability before the election (Maskin and Tirole's "feedback" case). In the three-period case, with two elections, the dynamic … evolution of confirmation bias can lead to more pandering before the first election. Finally, we show that when confirmation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492
We show that a large electorate of ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive very noisy signals about her performance. We find that the accountability problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011287647
on higher candidate salience in small municipalities. We also quantify the election advantage of a slate being randomly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457402
state and federal elections. We examine whether being involved in the scandal influenced re-election prospects and voter …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459205